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Policyholder Control of a
Mutual Life Insurance Company
Buist A. Anderson*
F ROM TIME TO TIME DURING the last hundred years or more, there
have been discussions concerning the control or the lack of control
by policyholders of mutual life insurance companies.1 While this is
certainly not a new issue, there have been several recent developments.
One recent development is a so-called "class action" suit brought
in October 1972 against four large mutual life insurance companies
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.2 This antitrust suit was brought on behalf of three policyholders
as representatives of a class consisting of all mutual life insurance
policyholders. The complaint alleges, among other things, a conspiracy
among defendant insurance companies to use outdated and antiquated
mortality tables, to charge unreasonably high and redundant premium
rates, and to create self-perpetuating management.
This suit requests the court to order the defendants to refrain
from violating the Federal antitrust laws, to correct their accounting
procedures so that policyowners can more accurately determine the
actual cost of their insurance, to refrain from using surplus funds
for ventures unrelated to the insurance business, to distribute to
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TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITnE, MONOGRAPH 28, STLDY OF LEGAL RE-
SERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 13-27 (G.P.O. 1941).
One method of classifying life insurance companies is according to the legal form of
their ownership. In general, stock insurance companies can be defined as being that type of
organization in which individuals purchase shares of stock in the company in the expecta-
tation, or at least the hope, of appreciation in the value of their shares. As such, the stock-
holders legally own the company and may cast votes in proportion to their shareholdings
for the election of the board of directors. Further, the stockholders share in the profits and
losses of the company as do the stockholders in any other corporation.
In contrast to a stock insurance company, a mutual insurance company is said to be
legally "owned" by the policyholders; consequently, the policyholder in a mutual insurance
company is both a customer and an owner of the company, whereas the policyholder in a
stock insurance company is only a customer. Therefore, each policyowner in the mutual in-
surance company usually may cast one vote for the election of the board of directors, irre-
spective of the amouunt of insurance the policyowner may own, while the stock company
policyowner, being merely a customer, except in rare instances, does nor have a vote at stock-
holder meetings and as such does not have a voice in the election of the board of directors.
In short, stock insurance companies are organizations owned by investors who purchase
shares of stock for profit while mutual insurance companies are organizations owned by
policyholders themselves.
2 Steingart v. The Equitable Life Assuru. Soc'y, Civil No. 72-4271 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 6,
1972).
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policyowners the excessive sums now being held as surplus, and to
institute proper procedural actions to assure policyowners just par-
ticipation in the management and affairs of the companies.
A second recent development is a 1972 law review article assert-
ing that there is an emergency justifying reform. The author ad-
vocates a year-long study by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, and in the interim, "speedy" enactment by all states
of a "temporary mutual insurance company control bill. ' 4 The pro-
posed legislation would:
(1) require mutual insurance companies to furnish their
policyholders with annual proxy or information statements
containing information similar to that supplied shareholders
of stock companies and liberalize nominating procedures for
the election of directors . ..
(2) require the return to policyholders in the form of
dividends of all premiums not needed for the sound conduct
of the business as determined by reserve and actuarial tables
prescribed annually by the Superintendent of Insurance after
public hearings; and
(3) prohibit the acquisition or initiation of operation by
mutual insurance companies of businesses outside the imme-
diate insurance field served by them and require divestiture
within three years of such unrelated businesses now owned.5
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has met
in regular sessions three times since that article was published, and
the author of that article may have brought his proposal to the at-
tention of one or more commissioners of insurance. However, it was
not placed on the agenda of any one of the three meetings, and there
is no published evidence that this proposal was considered. If the com-
missioners had thought that there were any real and pressing evil to
be corrected, it might reasonably be assumed that the matter would
have been discussed at one of the meetings.
Another relatively recent law review article,6 which dealt with
the aspect of control in mutual life insurance companies, reached the
conclusion that there is actually a conflict of interest between the
policyholders and the management of a mutual life insurance com-
3 Kreider, Who Owns the Mutuals? Proposals For Reform of Aembersbip Rights in Mutual
Insurance and Banking Companies, 41 UCIN.L.REV. 275 (1972).
4 Id. at 307.
5Id. at 311.
6 Hethcrington, Fact v. Fiction: Wbo Owns Mutual Insurance Companies, 1969 WIS.L.REv.
1068.
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pany.7 The author's reasoning which supported this conclusion was
basically by way of a two-part analysis of the policyholder's position
in mutual life insurance companies.
The first part of the article looked at the mutual policyholder as
an owner. In this initial phase of analysis the author recognized that
although the policyholder is legally the owner of the mutual company,
he is not actually the owner in the normal business sense, since he
does not bear the risk of personal liability in the event of insolvency,
does not have a right to profits, and does not have the ability to con-
trol the management.9
To support his conclusion that there is a conflict of interest be-
tween the policyholder and the management regarding the ownership
aspect of mutual companies, the author stated that because the policy-
holder considers himself nothing more than a consumer of services
offered by management, he has no interest in the management aspect
of the company 10 and, consequently, the interests of the policyholder
are not seriously involved in management decisions. 1
The second part of the author's analysis considered the mutual
life insurance company from the management perspective. The author
reasoned that although mutual managements attempt to conserve cor-
porate assets and promote corporate growth, these objectives are in-
appropriate for mutual stock companies because such goals are adverse
to policyholder interests. The author concluded that these manage-
ment objectives were adverse to policyholder interests, due to the fact
that the policyholder is principally interested in securing the maxi-
mum protection at the lowest cost. 3
Since the stated purpose of the article was simply an analysis of
the position of the policyholder in mutual insurance companies, 14 the
author made no definite recommendations for improving the policy-
holder's position.
The facts of life are that one does not get "reform" either by
the legislative or the administrative process unless the need for re-
form is established. The authors of the two law review articles cer-
tainly have not established this need. What they have done is to
7Id. at 1102.
'Id. at 1070.
9 Id. at 1071.
'lId. at 1086.
11 Id. at 1085.
"Id. at 1102.
131d.
1 Id,. at 1069.
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repeat what all familiar with the situation already know, namely that
the policyholders of a mutual life insurance company have little voice
in the selection of management. However, it must be recognized that
individual stockholders of a large stock life insurance company also
have little voice in the selection of management where the stock is
widely held and where there is no gross mismanagement. Both authors
seem to think that the stock life insurance situation is much better
than the mutual life situation from the standpoint of control by the
"owners." However, both with large stock life insurance companies
and with mutual life insurance companies, the boards of directors or
trustees are, in fact, self-perpetuating bodies. The president usually
has a major voice in the selection of new directors and these directors
may feel beholden to him.
By and large, the directors of life insurance companies, mutual
and stock, are dedicated persons of prominence in their communities
and ofttimes of prominence nationally. They seem to know the differ-
ence between right and wrong, and there have been few instances of
breach of trust or departure from high ethical standards. Where there
have been such departures, remedial steps have come promptly. Within
the last twenty years or so, there have been two or three instances of
such departure which have occurred in large mutual life insurance
companies. In these instances, the directors of such companies, per-
haps prodded by regulatory authorities, promptly removed the top
officers from their positions.
This matter of policyholder control of mutual life insurance com-
panies has, over the years, received much attention from regulatory
authorities, from state legislatures, and from specially appointed com-
missions. Variously worded state statutes attempt to give the policy-
holder of a mutual life insurance company a voice in the selection of
management.15 However, no mutual life insurance company has yet
succeeded in persuading any considerable percentage of its policy-
holders to take the trouble to vote for directors."' Some companies do
"See e.g. MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 175 §94 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §61A.32 (1968);
N.Y. INS. LAW §198 (McKinney 1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3913.10 (Page 1971);
TENN. CODE ANN. §56-1606 (1968).
"The following table indicates the results of elections in 1972 in a number of important mu-
tual life insurance companies. No. of Ia-
divijual Life Votes Cast at 1972 Election of Directors
Company Policyholders' Ia Pnrson By Mail By Proxy Total
Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company 21,611,636" 47 669 716
Prudential Insurance Company
of America 20,054,502 348 348
New York Life Insurance
Company 5,484,012 219 252 471
John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company 8,138,692 4,082 52 4,134
(Continued on next page)
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notify their policyholders of their voting rights in practically every
communication to policyholders, including premium notices. While
the companies which make greater efforts seem to have a larger
number of votes, these sincere efforts have all resulted in failure.
The simple answer seems to be that policyholders are interested in
buying insurance and do not regard themselves as owners of an equity
in the company as in the case of stockholders. It is probably a fact
that a large percentage of policyholders do not even remember the
names of the companies in which they are insured, and do not dis-
tinguish between stock and mutual companies. The policyholders seem
to rely on their agents in whom they have some confidence.
Mutual life insurance companies, as well as stock life insurance
companies operate in a fish bowl. They must disclose annually to reg-
ulatory authorities many details of their operations, including com-
pensation of directors and of top officers, investments and investment
results, legislative expenses, resisted claims, payments to lawyers, as
well as countless other details. They are also subject to periodic ex-
aminations by insurance regulatory officials which, in the case of the
larger companies, includes representatives of other states in which
they do business. Usually these detailed examinations are conducted
on a three year basis. Many of these regulatory requirements stem
Compavy
(Continued from pre
No. of In-
dividual Life
Policybolders*
Equitable Life Assurance
Company 3,452,744
Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company 1,999,360
Mutual Life Insurance Company
of New York 1,679,183
Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company 1,181,345
New England Mutual Life
Insurance Company 1,098,830
Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Company 1,060,501
Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Company 1,011,917
Bankers Life Company 635,793
Provident Mutual Life
Insurance Company 396,572
Union Central Life Insurance
Company 355,532
Western and Southern Life
Insurance Company 1,878,253
ceding page)
Votes Cast at 1972 Election of Directors
In Person By Mail By Proxy Total
6 129 2 137
83 32
155 37
1,291
7 707
525 680
223 223
3,943 4,977
61,446 61,446
302,402 302,402
*At year end 1972, including term insurance but excluding industrial and group insur-
surance, All figures are from the 1972 Annual Statements.
* 1971 election. The Metropolitan resumed annual elections in 1973 in lieu of elections
every two years.
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from the Armstrong Investigation of Life Insurance in New York in
1905,17 and these requirements have been updated from time to time,
as the need has developed.
Numerically, mutual life insurance companies represent but a
small percentage of all life insurance companies. Presently there are
154 mutual life insurance companies in the United States, and the
total number of life insurance companies exceeds 1800.18 These mutual
companies, however, have roughly two-thirds of the assets and slightly
more than one-half of the business in force.19 This larger size is a re-
flection of the fact that the average age of the mutual companies is
much higher than the average age of the stock companies, a large per-
centage of which have been organized during the last twenty years.
The possibility of any material change in the number of mutual
life insurance companies is small. Many of these companies were
organized as stock companies, and later mutualized by buying out the
interest of the stockholders, usually over a period of years. The pos-
sibility that many other stock life insurance companies will be mutual-
ized is now small, primarily because the market value of life insurance
stocks is, in almost every instance, substantially above the book value.0
This situation did not exist a number of years ago when several life
insurance companies were converted into mutuals. There have also
been instances where mutual companies have been converted into
stock companies, but this does not occur frequcntly. It may therefore
reasonably be anticipated that the number of mutual life insurance
companies will remain about the same as at present, but that their
share of the total life insurance market will decrease.
The argument usually advanced for greater policyholder par-
ticipation in the selection of directors of mutual life insurance com-
panies is that these policyholders occupy positions similar to stock-
holders in a stock life insurance company. The statement is often
made that the policyholders are the "owners" of the company." This
is true in the sense that there are no others who could be classed as
owners of a mutual life insurance company. However, the courts have
17 NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATURE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INvESTIGATION OF LIF INSUR-
ANCE (1906). See Anderson, The Armstrong Investigation in Retrospect, IX PROC. ASSN.
OF LIFE INSURANCE COUNSEL 237.
18 INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSoANCE, 1972 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 89.
19 Id.
20 This fact is apparent from a comparison of the market value of life insurance company shares
as quoted in The Wall Street Journal with the book value as shown in BEST'S INSURANCE
REPORTS, LIFE-HEALTH, 1972.
21 Kreider, supra note 3, at 279; but see Hetheriogton, sapra note 6, at 1070-71.
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uniformly held that the relationship of a mutual life insurance com-
pany policyholder to his company is merely that of creditor and
debtor. 2
The Iowa Supreme Court in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bur-
bank" considered the relationship of a mutual policyholder to his
company at some length, stating:
While the plaintiff is a mutual company, and is owned by
its policyholders rather than by stockholders, it is neverthe-
less a corporate entity as distinct from its policyholders, as
is the stock company from its stockholders. The plaintiff's
policyholders sustain a double relationship to it: (1) That
of contractors with it; and (2) resulting therefrom that of
pro tempore owners of it.
They are owners only in a qualified sense. They change
from day to day, not by a mere transfer of interest which
persists in others, but by utter cancellation of the interests
of some and the acquirement by new contracts of newly
created and temporary interests by others. The policyholder
whose connection with the company expires by lapse, sur-
render or death has no interest which he may transmit in the
continued existence of the company. The policyholders have
no interest in the permanent surplus other than in the gains
from the investment thereof and as an assurance of the safety
of their contract. In the case of the stock company the stock
is owned by the holders in a different capacity than as policy-
holders, though the same person may be interested in both
capacities.24
When a policyholder of a mutual life insurance company takes
out his policy, in the usual case he starts out as a debtor rather than
as a creditor. This is because of the fact that the cost of putting his
policy on the books generally exceeds the premium he pays. In fact,
it may be five or six or more years before his company has recovered
this acquisition cost. Thereafter, his policy may make a contribution
to the suruplus of the company. However, in the beginning, he has,
in effect, borrowed surplus funds created by other policyholders, past
and present, which enabled the company to grant him his coverage.
Unlike the stockholder situation, the interest of a mutual policy-
holder ceases entirely when the policy proceeds are paid. There is noth-
ing left which he can bequeath to someone else or that his estate
2 Andrews v. Equitable life Assur. Society, 124 F.2d 788 (7th Cit. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 682 (1942); Brown v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 142 F.835, 839 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1906), rev'd, 151 F.1 (2nd Cir. 1907), afJ'd 213 U.S. 25 (1909); se9 W. VANCE
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 121 (3rd Ed. 1951).
13 209 Iowa 199, 216 N.W. 742, 743 (1927).
'1 Id. at 743.
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can sell. If his policy has remained in force a sufficient length of time,
he has made a contribution to the general surplus of the company
which may be used for the benefit of others who follow him as policy-
holders. However, if he lapses his policy early, or if he dies early, he
has received the benefit of surplus funds created by others. This is
not an unfair situation calling for reform.
Another argument advanced for greater policyholder participa-
tion in the management of a mutual life insurance company is that
this would result in increased policyholder dividends. 25 If this assump-
tion were true, the result might be quite unfortunate. Solvency should
be the prime objective in the management of any life insurance com-
pany and the dividend policy should never overlook this prime objec-
tive. Most mutual life insurance companies attempt to return to
policyholders each year, in dividends, the maximum amount which can,
with prudence, be returned. Pressure for large dividends comes from
the agency force and from the natural desire of management to have
their companies grow and their own salaries increase. If there is any
fault with the level of dividends currently being paid by mutual com-
panies, the fault is probably that the companies are paying out more
of their earnings than they should. If for any period of time a com-
pany does go overboard in the payment of policy dividends, in the
end the policyholders may suffer.
The argument advanced in the New York suit that the com-
panies have used outdated and antiquated mortality tables and that
they charge unusually high and redundant premium rates24 is not a
valid argument. Every large life insurance company is constantly
studying its own mortality experience, its own investment experience
and expenses, and its own reserve situation in order to determine the
proper premium rates and the dividends which prudently can be paid.
The fact that the mortality is better than anticipated, that the ex-
penses are lower than assumed, or that the interest rate earned is
higher than assumed is reflected year by year in the dividend scale.
Also, it should not be forgotten that there are some state laws which
limit the surplus funds which a mutual life insurance company char-
tered in that state may accumulate.27 Realistically, these state laws,
are not of prime importance because one life insurance company with
a stated surplus of, for example, ten percent of liabilities may not be
nearly as strong as another company with a stated surplus of five
percent of liabilities but with a much more conservative reserve basis.
These various differences are taken into account by regulatory author-
ities and by the companies immediately involved.
25 Kreiier, ;pra note 3, at 294.
26Steingart v. The Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, Civil No. 72-4271, (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct, 6,
1972).
27 N.Y_ INS. LAW §§207, 216 (McKinney, 1966) as amended.
[Vol. 22:439d46
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Another argument sometimes advanced for greater policyholder
participation in the management of mutual life insurance companies
is that these companies should not be permitted to expand into other
fields, whether related or unrelated." From the standpoint of mutual
life insuruance companies and their policyholders, it would indeed be
unfortunate to place them in this sort of straitjacket. From the stand-
point of their competitors in the stock life field, this would be a most
favorable competitive development. It is quite true that any venture
into new fields by a life insurance company will usually result in an
initial loss of surplus just as any venture into a new field by any
business enterprise is likely to result in an initial expenditure of
capital. In the case of a mutual company, this surplus may have been
created by policyholders not at all interested in the new development.
If such restrictions had been applied in the past, mutual life insur-
ance companies would now be confined to selling individual life in-
surance policies. The major expansion some years ago in the accident
and health field and in group insurance was financed initially by
accumulated surplus funds created by policyholders, past and present.
These companies, from a practical standpoint, were required to enter
these new fields in order to serve a real public need and, equally im-
portant, to remain competitive with stock life insurance companies.
More recently, life insurance companies, stock and mutual, have ex-
panded their businesses to include mutual funds, variable annuities,
real estate, fire and casualty insurance, and other finance-related fields.
This expansion was imperative because of competitive situations
created by changing economic conditions. If mutual life insurance
companies were hamstrung and kept out of these new fields, both
related and unrelated, stock life insurance companies and other com-
petitors for the savings dollar would benefit. The public, however,
would suffer.
The New York Insurance Department has over the years de-
voted more attention to policyholder control of mutual life insurance
companies than any other state insurance department. This is only
natural because New York is the home state of mutual life insurance
companies which have more business in force than companies of any
other single state.29 New York has detailed legislation and regulation
relating to the election by policyholders of directors of mutual life
insurance companies."
28 Kreidcr, supra note 3, at 295, 311.
19 Mutual life insurance companies chartered in New York include The Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society of the United States, Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, Home life
Insurance Company, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Mutual Life Insurance Company
of New York, and New York Life Insurance Company. The assets of these and other New
York chartered muual life insuruance companies total about one-fourh of the assets of all
United States life insurance companies and approach one-half of the assets of all United
States mutual life insurance companies. See BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, LIrE - HEALTH,
1972.
" N.Y. INS. LAw § 188 (MeKinney, 1966) as amended.
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In 1966, the then Superintendent of Insurance of New York,
Henry Root Stern, Jr., had this to say concerning those who were at-
tacking the existing system of policyholder elections and control:
Pious protestations have lately been heard in various
quarters regarding the allegedly 'undemocratic' management
of mutual life insurers. Procedures for the elections of direc-
tors of mutual companies have been brought into question.
Solicitous concern has been expressed that the management
of some mutuals is not responsive enough to the policyhold-
ers' wishes.
Considering the source of these righteous accusations,
one is reminded of a passage from Shakespeare. The lines
were spoken by his King Richard III. They go as follows:
And thus I clothe my naked villainy
With odd old ends stolen forth of holy writ,
And seem a saint when most I play the devil.
Fortunately for the insuring public of New York State,
the Insurance Law for more than a centuury has been thwart-
ing people who have ambitions to 'play the devil' with the
interests of policyholders. The Insurance Department is not
greatly impressed by their 'odd old ends . . . of holy writ.'
Such saintly censures are particularly unconvincing when
they come from 'King Richards' notorious for manipulating
corporations for optimum profit at the expense of long-term
service to the community.
Despite their protestations, the 'King Richards' have an
ugly history in the business world. The 'King Richards' tend
to regard service to those who need insurance most as senti-
mentality, preferring their own brand of 'smart business.' 31
The motives of some of those who seek to change the present
system may be as pure as driven snow. However, Mr. Stern's criti-
cism may well apply to others.
In conclusion, it appears that the present system of policyholder
control or, if you will, lack of control, of mutual life insurance com-
panies seems to be the best practical solution. This is not to say the
system is perfect, but at least no other solution has evolved over the
last one hundred years despite this matter's having received long
and serious study. This is the conclusion reached by regulatory au-
thorities who are most familiar with the situation. Theoretical con-
31 Address, by Henry Root Stern, Jr., Institute of Life Insurance, March 11, 1966.
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siderations must give way to the practical, and the system must serve
the interests of the policyholders. If there is any real evil, as dis-
tinguished from theoretical evil, to be corrected, this would have been
done long ago.
Those who seek to change the present system of control would
seem to have the burden of proving that the change is needed for the
benefit of policyholders of mutual life insurance companies. Perhaps
also they should establish that King Richard's statement does not have
any application to them. Theoretical suggestions not clearly demon-
strated to be factually related to the welfare of the mutual policy-
holder, should be ignored.
We certainly do not need further regulation merely for regula-
tion's sake. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the
individual state regulatory officials, and the state legislators are now
faced with many real regulatory problems and should not concern
themselves with theoretical situations where no real need for reform
has been established.
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